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I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial system often subjects the victim in a rape case to an in-
ordinate amount of prejudicial circumstance in an attempt to preserve
and protect the defendant's rights. Most often, the victim has been treated
unfairly. This is demonstrated in the lack of confidentiality afforded the
victim of rape when her rape-crisis center records are admitted into evi-
dence and scrutinized in court. Of course, this can not be considered
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analogous to the lack of confidentiality afforded to the tort victim when
his or her medical records are scrutinized in court because medical issues
relevant in a tort case are not present in a rape trial.
The victim of rape is clearly distinguishable from the plaintiff in a civil
suit. For instance, the victim in a rape case is not a party to the suit,
rather the state brings the cause of action. Further, in a tort case, the
health of the plaintiff is at issue, whereas in a rape case, the victim's
mental anguish is merely a consequence of the crime. The fact at issue
in a rape case is the act itself, and not the victim's mental conditions as
a result of the act. Yet, our judicial system often subjects the victim to a
plethora of inquiries regarding her mental health.1
It is evident that when this type of questioning occurs, the victim must
overcome the presumption that she is at fault. As it exists, the prosecution
of the rapist also results in the prosecution of the victim. However, it is
undeniable that the defendant in a rape case is presumed innocent until
a judicial determination states otherwise. 2 A dilemma arises when the
court attempts to balance the victim's right to bring the accused to trial
and the defendant's right to prove his innocence. Currently, the judicial
system favors the presumption of the defendant's innocence, presupposing
that the victim has falsely accused her attacker.3 Therefore, the victim
must not only overcome her fears of facing her attacker in court, she
must also deal with the underlying presumption in society that the sexual
assault was consensual.
4
1 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1989); State v. Trammel, 237
Neb. 137, 437 N.W.2d 197 (1989).
2In criminal cases, due process requires a presumption of the innocence of the
defendant. Therefore, the state has the burden of proving each element of a crime
using the requisite standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Our judicial system
requires that until there is a judicial determination of guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt," at no time is there a presumption that the defendant is guilty of a crime
regardless of what the base of supporting facts has established. See Rose v. Clark,
No. 84-1974 (U.S. July 2, 1986); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979);
County Court of Olster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149 (1979);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215-16 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 693 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); 1 J. WEINSTEIN ON
EVIDENCE § 303(03).
3 As it stands, the legal system perpetuates the societal assumption that women
are fabricating rape charges. The women are questioned as to their role as a
participant in the sexual act, as opposed to their role as victims. See Note, Rape
I, 3 RUTGERS L. J., WOMENS' RIGHT LAW REPORT 45, 54 (1976) (arguing for a better
understanding of the woman as a victim of rape and not as a defendant in a
criminal proceeding).
4Wood, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CnIm.
L. REV. 355, 347 (1973); Ross, The Rights of Women: The Basic ACLU Guide to
Women's Rights 181-184 (1973).
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II. THE SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A RAPE CASE
A. The Therapy Setting in a Rape Crisis Center
1. The Victim's experience
The trauma that a rape victim endures is a unique aspect of the crime.
A victim of rape is affected on two levels, the physical and emotional.
This fact differentiates the rape victim from victims of other crimes.
Although victims of any crime tend to feel violated, this fact is escalated
in rape. This is due to the fact that rape is the ultimate personal violation;
the rapist takes the soul.5
Physical complications after a rape may vary. For instance, the victim
may experience vaginal, rectal or oral venereal disease, infections caused
by lacerations or caused by sexual penetrations, bruises and broken bones,
and the fear of pregnancy.6 However, not all victims evidence physical
symptoms after being raped. This can be a problem since often society
concludes that if the victim is not bruised, she has not struggled.7 This
is simply a fallacy. For instance, a victim of acquaintance rape may be
overpowered physically but may not evidence any bruises." In this in-
stance, it is exceptionally difficult to prove that the victim has not con-
sented.9
The rape experience also results in an inordinate number of psycho-
logical symptoms. Emotional scars rendered due to rape are numerous
and effect every aspect of the victim's life. For instance, victims evidence
emotional symptoms such as a sense of guilt, a fear of participation in
further sexual relationships, and the fear of having to explain their trau-
5 Address by the late Dr. Ann Davis, Ph.D. in Sociology, at Miami University
(October 10, 1987). See also J. VAN ATTA, RAPE PREVENTION PROGRAM: AN OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE RAPE COUNSEL-
ING SERVICES IN OHIO 12-15 (1987) (discusses the need to empower women who
have lost their sense of worth and energy to overcome psychological difficulties);
K. JOHNSON, IF You WERE RAPED 1-15 (1985).
6 Address by the late Dr. Ann Davis, Ph.D. in Sociology, at Miami University
(October 10, 1987). See also R. WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 182-183
(1988)[hereinafter CALLED]; J. KATZ, No FAIRY GODMOTHERS, No MAGIC WANDS
11-19 (1984)[hereinafter GODMOTHERS]; J. HENSLIN & K. LIGHT, SOCIAL PROBLEMS
200-215 (1983); M. Koss, RAPE AND ITS VICTIM: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS' HEALTH
FACILITIES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES, CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 56-60 (1975);
Becker & Abel, The Treatment of Victims of Sexual Assault, Q. J. OF CORRECTIONS
38-42 (1977); S. BROWN MILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL; MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 384-
386 (1975)[hereinafter WILL].
7 There is also an assumption that physical symptoms need to be present in
order to substantiate a woman's claim that she has been raped. See GoDMOTHERS,
supra note 6, at 12.
" See CALLED, supra note 6, at 18-21. (analyzes and discusses the special prob-
lems that are faced by a victim of acquaintance rape).
9 Id.
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matic experience in the courtroom. 0 As a result, rape is an underreported
crime.1' Meanwhile, approximately 38%-65% of women are sexually as-
saulted, and of this number, one of every five college women has reported
being assaulted.12 For these women, the problem only begins on the day
of the assault. What is to follow is often more traumatic for the victim
than the actual rape itself.
2. The Victim's Stages of Recovery
A rape victim often undergoes stages of recovery. First, a rape victim
carries with her a current and vivid memory of the traumatic experience.13
As a result, she may feel voiceless as if she were trapped in an earlier
time.14 Still, such victims are expected to resurface into society and resolve
the trust issues with which they have struggled since the rape. 5 This
leaves the victim characteristically cautious and confused.16 She often
questions praise from people, since the shame of being raped has dete-
riorated her self image. 17 Finally, unable to cope, she may deny her ex-
perience since her sense of degradation may leave her with a feeling that
she has no physical or psychological space.'
It is at this crisis stage that women enter therapy. 9 A woman during
the crisis stage exhibits her stress through acute anxiety attacks.2 0 Her
10 Telephone interview with T. Nelson, Counselor and student volunteer trainer
at Oxford Crisis and Referral Center (December 15, 1989); L. LEDRY, PRACTICAL
ADVICE IN OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA OF POLICE AND COURT 33-37 (1986); GOD-
MOTHERS, supra note 6, at 52-62.
1 Uniform Bureau of Crime Report, F.B.I. (October 24, 1979); See also D.
BOKOWSKI, SEXUAL ASSAULT NEEDS ASSESSMENT SURVEY (1988) (also noted was
that the F.B.I. records indicate that one of every ten women raped reported the
rape and that 4,305 women actually reported being the victim of forcible rape in
Ohio in 1987).
11 Uniform Bureau of Crime Report, F.B.I. (October 24, 1979). Often, women
who are on record with the F.B.I. for reporting these crimes are never heard from
again after their initial contact with rape-crisis center personnel.
3 See D. ROBERTS, RAPED 157-159 (1981); Burgess & Holstrom, Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 984 (1974) (The victim also may be triggered
to recall her experience by the simple smell of the attacker's cologne).
" Supra notes 10 and 13.
11 WILL, supra, note 6, at 386-88; GODMOTHERS, supra note 6, at 86-89; R.
COURTUIS, WORKING WITH RAPE VIcIMs: CHOICE PoINTs AND VITAL INFORMATION
(1973)[hereinafter WORKING WITH RAPE VICTIMS].
16 WORKING WITH RAPE VICTIMS, supra note 15.
17 Castleman, If your lover gets raped, Medical Self Care (1980) (available from
"Men Against Rape Crisis Network" brochure).
18 See supra note 5. See also Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 13. (describing
long term reorganizational Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms associated
with Rape Trauma Syndrome.)
19 K. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 13-15. Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 13
(describing the reorganizational phase and noting that the victim often enters
therapy to deal with her anxiety).
2 Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 13.
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obsessive thoughts of rape play in her nightmares like a broken record.21
As a result, the victim engages in compulsive behavior, such as excessive
hand washing, to rid herself of guilt.22 Not only do these victims blame
themselves, in an attempt to validate their experiences, they often voice
anger towards their attacker and moments later try to mask this feeling
by attempting to care for him.2 3 It is the recording of these behaviors that
often has a detrimental effect on a rape prosecution. Lastly, these victims
live with the constant fear that their attacker may strike again.24 This
fear is often a deterrent to women actually prosecuting their attacker.
3. The Therapeutic Relationship: Victim and Therapist Exchange
The counselor/psychologist is often the victim's only outlet. Unless the
rape crisis counselor can ensure the victim a confidential relationship, it
is nearly impossible for the victim to disclose her feelings.2 5 This phe-
nomena can be paralleled to the need for confidentiality between a psy-
chologist and a client in a rape case. 26 Both the rape crisis center counselor
and the psychologist serve a similar purpose, which is to allow a rape
victim to voice her feelings.
In therapy, it is important for the counselor to validate the victim's
experience. 27 The most common occurrence in therapy is that the victim
will blame herself.28 In this instance, the therapist must listen gently but
take a strong stand against self blame.29 However, the notes taken in
these sessions are discoverable records which the defendant may seek to
use to impeach the victim. It is the rape counselor's duty to focus first
and foremost upon the woman.3 0 In doing so, the counselor must alleviate
the woman's feelings that she is a personal failure and must convince
her that she can trust people again.31 Only in an atmosphere of confi-
2
1 Id. See also GODMOTHERS, supra note 6, at 26-29, 75-77; CALLED, supra note
6, at 67-69; telephone interview with T. Nelson, counselor and student volunteer
trainer at Oxford Crisis and Referral Center (December 15, 1989).
22 Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 13.
3 Id.
24 L. HoLsTRoM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL REACTIONS
"GErrTG THE CASE TO TRIAL" (1983).
25 Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 13; J. VAN ATTA, A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING
COMPREHENSIVE RAPE COUNSELING SERVICES IN OHIO (September,
1987)[hereinafter GUmE]; GODMOTHERS, supra note 6, at 78-80.
26 Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987).
1 See supra note 5. See also GUIDE, supra note 25, at 5.
'8 Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 13; CALLED, supra note 6, at 13-17; GOD-
MOTHERS, supra note 6 at 10-11.
2 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 10. See also The seven components against coun-
seling (Feb. 1, 1990) (material available at W.G. Nord Community Health Center);
address by Rape Crisis Center Counselor, Oxford Crises and Referral Center
Miami University student forum (Oct. 13, 1987).
3 The seven components against counseling (Feb. 1, 1990) (material available
at W.G. Nord Community Health Center).
31 Id. See also GUIDE, supra note 25, at 8; Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 13,
at 984-85.
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dential interpersonal disclosure can these goals be accomplished. 2 Pre-
paring a woman for litigation is "probably the hardest aspect of therapy,"
33
and would be substantially more difficult if her personal feelings and
fears are sure to become part of the courtroom proceeding.
4. Courtroom Setting
In Commonwealth v. Lloyd, Justice Larsen poignantly acknowledges
that victims of rape are treated substantially different than are victims
of other crimes .4 Larsen utilized an example by Connie K. Borkanhagan
of Albuquerque, New Mexico which illustrates how the cross-examination
of a robbery victim would sound if performed in a similar fashion as a
cross-examination of a rape victim:
35
(Q) 'Mr Smith, you were held up at gunpoint on the corner
of first and Main?"
(A) "Yes"
(Q) "Did you struggle with the robber?"
(A) "No"
(Q) "Why not?"
(A) "He was armed."
(Q) "Then you made a conscious decision to comply with his
demands rather than to resist."
(A) "Yes"
(Q) "Did you scream? Cry Out?"
(A) "No. I was afraid."
(Q) "I see. Have you ever been held up before.?"
(A) "No"
(Q) "Have you ever given money away?"
(A) "Yes, of course."
(Q) "And you did so willingly?"
(A) "What are you getting at?"
(Q) "Well let's put it like this, Mr. Smith, you've given money
away in the past. In fact, you've had quite a reputation for
philanthropy. How can we be sure you weren't contriving to
have your money taken from you by force?"
(A) "Listen, if I wanted ..."
(Q) "Never mind. What time did this holdup take place, Mr.
Smith?"
(A) "About 11:00 pm"
(Q) "You were out on the street at 11:00 pm? Doing what?
(A) "Just walking"
32 See supra note 25. See also K. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 15-17; D. ROBERTS,
supra note 13, at 120-25; address by Rape Crisis Center Counselor, Oxford Crisis
and Referral Center Miami University student forum (Oct. 13, 1987).
Supra note 32. See also L. LEDRAY, PRACTICAL ADVICE IN OVERCOMING THE
TRAUMA OF POLICE AND COURT 19-20 (1986).
34 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989).
35 d. at 1373, 567 A.2d at 1373.
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(Q) "Just walking? You know that it's dangerous being out
in the street that late at night. Weren't you aware that you
could have been held up?"
(A) "I hadn't thought about it."
(Q) "What were you wearing at the time, Mr. Smith?"
(A) "Let's see ... a suit. Yes, a suit."
(Q) "An expensive suit?"
(A) "Well - yes. I'm a successful lawyer, you know"
(Q) "In other words, Mr. Smith, you were walking around
the streets late at night in a suit that practically advertised
the fact that you might be a good target for some easy money,
isn't that so? I mean, if we didn't know better, Mr. Smith, we
might even think you were asking for this to happen, mightn't
we?
36
It is evident that this type of questioning would never occur in a trial
for robbery.37 In fact, there is never a question in the incidence of robbery
that the victim has "consented" to the act.38 Further, the police advise
robbery victims to ensure their own safety and report the crime to the
authorities after the fact.39 In contrast, the victims of rape and other
forms of sexual assault are required to prove their lack of consent.40 In
this instance, their physical safety is in imminent danger, yet they are
required to make heroic gestures putting their life at risk in order to
avoid the accusation that they were a consensual participant in the
heinous crime.4' This occurrence acts as a deterrent to many women in
reporting the crime. Although victims no longer are questioned regarding
their past sexual conduct, there are still attempts to demonstrate that a
lack of physical struggle indicates consent.
4 2
III. DILEMMAS IN ADMITTING RECORDS INTO EVIDENCE
The aforementioned experiences of the rape victim are often not con-
sidered when the judicial system reviews the admissible evidence in a
rape case. There are two competing concerns that are considered by the
court in deciding whether or not to admit the rape crisis counselor's
records into evidence. First, the defendant is concerned with his consti-
tutional right of confrontation as well as his right to compel testimony,
and often claims that the lack of the admission of the victim's rape crisis
36 Id. citing The Legal Bias Against Rape Victims, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975)
(Report of the 1975 American Bar Association Mid-Year Conference).
31 WILL, supra note 6, at 383-84.
T8Id. at 365-68. See also The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case a Feminist View,
11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 347 (1973)("a woman must be bruised bloody and
damned near dead" in order to not be considered a participant rather than a
victim).
39 WILL, supra note 6, at 370.
Id. at 311.
41 Id. at 365-68, 372-73.
2Id. at 387. See also supra note 11.
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center records into evidence may be violative of this right.43 In contrast,
the victim is concerned with both her constitutional right to privacy
44
and the confidentiality privilege which she wishes to invoke in this sit-
uation.
45
The defendant seeks to use the counselor's records primarily to impeach
the victim through the utilization of assertions made during therapy
which differ from the those stated in court.46 For instance, the victim may
at times state her confusion to a counselor. 47 However, by the time she
is questioned in court, she is able to speak about her traumatic experience
in a more coherent fashion. 48 This occurs because the victim's statements
in therapy are made in an attempt to sort out her feelings regarding the
attack and are not meant as testimonials for the record. Consequently,
these conflicting statements tend to shed an unfavorable light upon the
victim.
49
The defendant may also seek to use these records in the voire dire
process. 50 In this instance, defense counsel will try to determine whether
or not the victim possesses abnormal psychological characteristics which
would impair the court from using her as a credible witness.5 1 This allows
the defendant's attorney to make conclusions regarding the mental ca-
pacity of the victim, which seems a bit inappropriate. Also, the defendant
may use these records in cross-examination of the victim during trial in
order to damage or blacken the victim's character.
52
All of these uses may substantially damage the victim's case. Yet, the
court will admit these records found to be imperative to the defense of
the alleged rapist.53 However, the victim may argue that the constitution
affords her the right of privacy in certain matters.5 This privacy is es-
pecially critical in the case of rape since the symptoms of a rape victim
embody a personal conflict.55 As a result, the victim often makes incon-
sistent and competing statements in her psychological recovery process
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 10.
"U.S. CONST. amend I. See also infra note 120 (The Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Constitution to afford citizens privacy in certain matters).
4 This is a right that has been afforded in similar situations, where there has
been a counseling relationship analogous to that of the rape crisis center coun-
selor-victim relationship. See infra notes 97-135.
"Clifton v. Alaska, 758 P.2d 1279 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); People v. District
Court in and for the City and County of Denver, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986).
41 Id. See also GODMOTHER, supra note 6, at 15 - 20.
48 Id.
49 Id.
so State v. Pierson, 201 Conn. 211, 514 A.2d 724 (1986).
51 Id.
52 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1359 (1989); Commonwealth
v. Grayson, 466 Pa. 427, 353 A.2d 428 (1976).
Id. (The courts in Grayson and Lloyd noted that the victim may still be cross-
examined in the absence of these records).
Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120, 169 (1987). Also,
the courts have already determined that private family matters are protected by
the Constitution. See infra note 120.
"See supra notes 5-24.
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that may merely cloud the issue in court.56 Therefore, it is often difficult
to balance the victim's confidentiality privilege with the defendant's right
to confront his accuser in court.
In an attempt to balance the concerns of both the victim and the de-
fendant, courts often will view the evidence in-camera.57 In this instance,
the court will view the records and make a determination as to whether
or not the evidence is relevant to the issue in the case.5 8 Also, the de-
fendant's attorney will have access to these records. 59 This occurrence
may allow the defendant to use the records in a fashion that will cause
an inordinate amount of prejudice towards the victim.60 If this is true,
even with a limiting instruction, such as would occur after the in-camera
inspection of the records, the adverse affect of these records may outweigh
their probative value.61 A representation of this circumstance occurs when
the defense counsel is afforded the opportunity to impeach the victim
after viewing the records with the eyes of an advocate which may lead
to a highly prejudicial line of questioning.6 2 When this occurs, the victim's
rationalizations in therapy are viewed as contradictory facts in evidence.
In this context, the information is unreliable because it is the victim's
perception of her feelings and not the alleged rape incident. Further, the
atmosphere of the rape crisis counseling center is one of sanctity for the
victim, and absent this guarantee, it will be difficult for the victim to
have a successful interchange in counseling sessions.0 The victim will
either avoid prosecution, or avoid full disclosure in therapy due to the
risk she will be taking of having her feelings of guilt and confusion
paraded as exculpatory evidence in a court of law. Therefore, absent a
6Lloyd, 523 Pa. at 427, 567 A.2d at 1357 (Justice Larsen points out in his
dissent that the conflicting statements of the victim often confuse the jury as to
the facts of the case).
51 State v. D'Ambrosia, 212 Conn. 50, 561 A.2d 422 (1989); Commonwealth v.
Nelson, 311 Pa. Super. 1, 456 A.2d 1383 (1983); Advisory Opinion to the House
of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (1983).
See Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1161.
See supra note 57.
6 FED. R. EviD. 403 reads as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
61 Courts have determined that if a limiting instruction, such as in FED. R.
Evm. 105, does not diminish the danger of the adverse effect, the evidence is still
not admissible. See Harris v. Illinois-California Express Inc., 687 F.2d 924, 926
(2d. Cir. 1976); FED. R. EviD. 105 (Rule 105 allows the judge to instruct the jury
on the limited purpose for which the evidence will be used).
62 WILL, supra note 6, at 370-71.
- See Oxford Crisis and Referral Center Manual (1990) which states: "All
sexual assault survivors have a right to recover from victimization at their own
pace, in their own style, and not one imposed by society." Id.; F. GUEST, To
COMFORT AND RELEEvE THEM: RAPE CRISIS CENTER 3-15 (1977) [hereinafter To
COMFORT] (available at Grady Memorial Hospital Atlanta); R. GIsSMAN, SURVIV-
ING SEXUAL ASSAULT 23-27 (1977). See also supra note 32.
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privilege, this information would not exist in the first place. Rather,
therapeutic disclosures would be guarded in anticipation of trial. All of
these considerations will be examined in detail later in this note.
IV. SITUATIONS ANALOGOUS TO THE RAPE-CRISIS CENTER
A. Waiver of Privilege by the Patient-Litigant Exception
In the case of rape, the victim's mental health is not a probative issue
in the determination of whether or not the crime has occurred. In contrast,
other situations exist in which a party places his or her mental health
in question. When this occurs, courts conclude that by putting mental
health into question, the party has waived the physician-patient (and/or
psychologist-patient) privilege. 64 This privilege protects the patient by
holding the physician responsible for unauthorized disclosures of medical
information.6 5 When the physician-patient privilege is deemed waived,
this waiver enables the judicial system to access medical records which
are probative to the issue in the case.6 6 However, the tort plaintiff does
not waive the confidentiality privilege merely by filing a personal injury
action.6 7 The opposing party has the burden of proving that the adversary
has affirmatively placed his or her medical conditions at issue.68
It follows that the victim of rape also should not be viewed as waiving
her confidentiality privilege merely by prosecuting her attacker. After
all, the issue in a rape trial is not the victim's mental health, but rather
whether or not she was forced into participating in sexual acts against
her willY9 In this instance, the mental health of a rape victim is not
placed into question merely by filing charges.
70
In other contexts, courts have taken into consideration the rights of
the psychiatric patient. For instance, in Caeser v. Montanos, Justice Huf-
stedler in his concurrence sets limits upon unnecessary questioning of a
Bond v. District Court, in and for Denver County, 682 P.2d 33 (1989); Moses
v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950 (1988).
6 Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86,529 N.E.2d 1126 (1989).
" Id.
67 See supra note 64; State ex rel. Lambdin v. Brenton, 21 Ohio St. 2d 21, 254
N.E.2d 681 (1970).
Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y. 2d 278,536 N.E.2d 1126,539 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1989).
8 Ohio Victims of Crime Program, pamphlet (February 1985); Field, Attitudes
toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapist, Crisis Counselors and
Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 156-179 (1978).
70 Arguably, the issue in a rape case is whether or not the victim has consented.
Legally, mental health is not at issue in a rape case as one of the elements of the
crime. However, courts have indicated that if "disclosure of [such mental health
records] is essential to a fair determination of guilt or innocence .. ." of the
accused, there production, at least for an evidentiary hearing, may be required.
State v. Pena, 487 N.Y.S. 2d 935, 938, 127 Misc. 2d 1057, 1059 (1985). But see
Estate of Kofsky, 487 Pa. 473, 482, 409 A.2d 1358, 1362 (1979) (the attorney-
client privileged communication proscribes not only "giving evidentiary consid-
eration to confidential communications, but also their very disclosure." State v.
Pena, 127 Misc. 2d 1057, 487 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1985); Estate of Kofsky, 487 Pa. 473,
409 A.2d 1358 (1979).
[Vol. 5:1
RAPE VICTIMS
psychiatrist by disallowing questions involving the ultimate diagnosis of
a patient unless a party has shown that this information is necessary to
the ultimate determination of the case.71 Similarly, in State v. Trammel,
the court refused to admit any evidence concerning the treatment of the
rape victim for a previous mental condition when she was orally, rectally
and vaginally sodomized.7 2 The court determined that the victim's pre-
vious mental condition was not relevant to the issue of whether or not
she was raped.
73
Considerations which disallow past mental conditions to be entered
into evidence are present in rape crisis center records as well. These
considerations include the basis of trust inherent in any therapeutic re-
lationship, the highly personal nature of rape, and the need to guarantee
the victim privacy in order to motivate her initially to seek help.
74 Without
this guarantee, victims often do not prosecute their attacker because they
fear trepidation in court.
75
B. Various Recognized Testimonial Privileges
1. The Licensing Distinction
Confidentiality exists within several professional relationships. The
consummate example of privilege is the attorney-client privilege. Re-
cently, there has been an effort to afford privileged communications in
other types of relationships 6 because a privilege is established to honor
the needs of the client, not the needs of a professional. 77 However, there
has been a line drawn by state legislatures and the judicial system making
a distinction between licensed practitioners and non-licensed practition-
ers when affording a confidentiality privilege.7 8 For instance, legislatures
have granted a physician-patient privilege in civil matters which has
been extended to criminal matters as well.7 9 Furthermore, professional
71 542 F.2d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
72 231 Neb. 137, 435 N.W.2d 197 (1989) (This court, however, still allowed the
defendant to view the current psychological data of the victim).
73 Id.
74 F. GUEST, To COMFORT AND RELIEVE THEM, RAPE CRISIS CENTER 3-15
(1977)(available at Grady Memorial Hospital, Atlanta). See also supra notes 5-
33 and accompanying text.
75 Victims often do not even initially report the crime. See supra note 42. See
also Rohmer, Judicial Attitudes toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303-307
(1973); R. GROSSMAN, SURVIVING SEXUAL ASSAULT 17-22 (1983); F. GUEST, supra
note 74, at 3-15.
718 J. WIGMoRE EVmENCE § 2288, 527 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Fisher, The
Psychotherapeutic Professions and The Law of Privileged Communications, 10
WAYNE L. REV. 609, 610 (1964); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law
Of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REV. 447 (1938).
17 Proposed FED. R. EVID. 504; 2 J. WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE 503, 504-18 (1980).
11 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989); Commonwealth
v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 490, 533 A.2d 120, 126 (1987).
19 State v. Munyon, 240 Kan. 53, 726 P.2d 1333 (1986); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 378 Pa. Super. 379, 548 A.2d 1250 (1988); State v. Camden, No. C-820067
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1982) (Westlaw, 1982 WL 9259)
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relationships which involve counseling in personal areas by a licensed
practitioner have been granted a privilege. 0 The same is not true in
matters involving non-licensed practitioners.
State legislatures rationalize this distinction by stating that the state
statutes which are drafted to provide confidentiality are intended to pro-
mulgate a privilege in order to protect confidential matters within a
treatment or diagnosis context.81 Since unlicensed practitioners approach
matters through counseling and do not utilize a diagnostic approach, they
are excluded. However, the judicial system has noted that the relationship
involved in a therapeutic setting with counselors other than licensed
medical doctors is similar to the relationship involving the treatment of
a rape victim by an unlicensed practitioner.8 2 Those who are properly
trained to help rape victims often partake in a counseling relationship
which is extremely valuable. Therefore, relationships involving treat-
ment of a rape victim by an unlicensed practitioner should also be taken
into consideration when the courts and legislatures are trying to deter-
mine whether or not a privilege should be afforded in this context.83
After all, a privilege protecting medical records is granted to ensure
the client (or victim) that the state is protecting the interest of its citizens
in obtaining valuable health care. 4 Therefore, by not also extending this
privilege to relationships where the practitioner is not licensed, the cit-
izen's right to receive valuable health care is seriously undermined. It is
important to note that the state's method of certifying people to provide
the aforementioned safe and valuable services is often the licensing pro-
cedure. However, in other circumstances, a practitioner may not be li-
censed, yet they often are certified as competent in their particular field.
For example, a rape crisis center counselor must undergo and pass a test
to ensure that they are qualified to counsel victims and to serve as bene-
ficial public servants, as well as private practitioners.
8 5
2. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence Granting a Privilege
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence consider granting a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, however, they do not incorporate such a priv-
See Stenger v. Lehigh Hosp. Center, 563 A.2d 531 (1989); (A doctor-patient
privilege has been asserted in an AIDS case affording an AIDS victim an exclusive
privilege.); People v Reidout, 140 Misc. 2d 632, 530 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1988). (In a
murder case, an inmate's confidential disclosures have been afforded a privilege).
61 E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 99 n. 1 (3rd ed. 1984).
12 Supra note 78. See also infra note 131.
8 See infra note 131.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1990 Supp.); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5945.1
(1982). (The states of Connecticut and Pennsylvania extended the privilege to
include sexual assault, thus keeping the victim's needs intact.)
Koss, The Scope of Rape, THE CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 88-91 (1983).
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ilege for the unlicensed practitioner. 6 Interestingly, the existing Federal
Rules of Evidence have yet to specify a broad physician-patient privilege.8 7
Instead, the Federal Rule of Evidence which grants such a privilege on
its face authorizes federal courts to recognize a federal physician-patient
privilege but prohibits state privileges.8 This authorization is not likely
to permit the federal courts to supersede state legislative guidelines.
Rather, the federal courts will recognize the states autonomy in this
matter. In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence are not intended to diminish
the effect of a state statute which affords a privilege. 9 The committee
indicated that the privilege laws carry out such a compelling state interest
that it would be inappropriate for federal law to supersede state sub-
stantive law in the area.90 Thus, once a state promulgates a privilege, it
will be honored. The rationale of this authorization is to promote quality
medical care by encouraging the patient to disclose all of the pertinent
information necessary to ensure a quality diagnosis and treatment proc-
ess.91 In addition, the privilege also may serve to protect the privacy
interests of patients .
92
This privacy rationale has been criticized because the lay person does
not seek treatment by a physician with a lawsuit in the forefront of their
mind.9 3 This, of course, is not the case for the rape victim who is aware
of her legal right to prosecute her attacker prior to seeking therapy. In
her case, the lack of a privilege is even more detrimental since she will
often avoid prosecution to alleviate any further embarrassment.
94
Despite criticism, many states have enacted a physician-patient priv-
ilege.925 States are also enacting privileges for patients of psychiatrists
and psychologists due to their special need for confidentiality.96
"The proposed rules set forth nine substantive areas of privileged commu-
nications as well as four procedural provisions. Congress chose, however, to reject
this attempt at specification, which also included several modifications of common
law privileges." G. WESENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 150, citing FED. R. EVID.
501, REPORT OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY. See also supra note 77;
1 J. WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE § 501[14].
17 1 J. WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE § 501 [14].
8 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER § 215.
89 L. WEST, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES, citing House of Comm. of Judiciary. Fed. R. Evid., H.R. REP. No.
650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7082.
Id. citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Republic Gear Co..
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 (2nd Cir. 1967).
91 E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98, 244 (3rd ed. 1984).
92 See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER § 215, 602 (1978) ("personal illness often
involves matters which patients reasonably prefer to keep confidential, and the
privilege may serve a valid social purpose in this regard.").
93E. Morgan, in forward to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 28 (1942).
" See Lore, 90% of Rapes not Reported, Scientists Say, The Columbus Dispatch,
Jan. 17, 1989, at 3, col. 2. See also supra notes 42 and 75.
96 E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98, 244 n.5 (fewer than ten states
do not recognize the physician-patient privilege).
G. WEISENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 151 citing report no. 45 of Psychiatry
92 (1960). See also FED. R. EVID. 501 (originally approved by the Supreme Court,
Article V of the Federal Rules contained 13 rules. These proposed rules are often
used).
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3. Psychiatrist-Patient Confidentiality Privilege
An example of a privilege granted due to the confidential nature of
disclosures in therapy is the privilege often present in the psychiatrist-
patient relationship.97 The privilege afforded a patient comes from two
sources: state statutes and a constitutional right which requires protec-
tion of privacy in personal matters.9 8 For instance, these privileges are
not extended to cover situations where a court appointed psychiatrist
examines the patient.99 In addition, the legislature needs to balance the
competing concerns regarding both the defendant's constitutional right
to confront the victim with the victim's right of privacy.1' ° However, in
order for the defendant to overcome the victim's right to privileged com-
munications in these matters, case law indicates that the defendant must
show a "particularized need" for the information which is sufficient to
outweigh society's and the victim's interest in maintaining the confiden-
tiality of communication in a psychotherapeutic relationship. 01 In Com-
monwealth v. Lloyd the court noted the limitations of the defendant's
right to confront the victim stating:
These rights are not absolute, unlimited rights to discover any
and all pieces of information existing anywhere in the world,
and are of course subject to the normal evidentiary admissi-
bility rules such as relevancy, materiality and competency, and
are subject as well to traditional testimonial privileges against
compelled disclosure of protected and/or confidential commu-
nications 102
97 See G. WEISENBERGER, supra note 96, citing report no. 45 of Psychiatry 92
(1960) ("Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain con-
fidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their
willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for
him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and,
indeed, privileged communication.")
18 Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyashi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1030 (D. Hawaii
1979); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), affd, sub nom. Edney v. Smith, 586 F.2d 556 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Common-
wealth v. Kyle, 369 Pa. Super. 484, 451 533 A.2d 120, 127 (1987) citing Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (medical records are guaranteed a privilege
due to the confidential relationship which exists between a doctor and a patient).
E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 246 n. 1 (3rd ed. 1989); U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
100 State v. Whitaker, 520 A.2d 1078, 202 Conn. 289 (1987) (The court honored
the defendant's rights to confront his accuser); People v. Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d
599, 500 N.E.2d 1026 (1986) (it is not unconstitutional to allow the defendant
access to the victim's medical records).
101 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989) (The court in
this case held that the defendant was denied his right to confrontation by not
having access to the victim's psychiatric records, absent a privilege, but it did





With these considerations in mind, state courts have ruled that a rape
victim who has consulted a licensed psychiatrist to receive psychotherapy
is entitled to a privilege, '03 This privilege is afforded when the confiden-
tial nature of the psychotherapeutic relationship is considered. 10 4 In this
therapeutic relationship, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a psychiatrist
to succeed if she is unable to assure a confidential and privileged com-
munication. 10 5 Arguably, a patient in psychotherapy will still be able to
communicate whether or not the legal system provides him with a con-
fidentiality privilege. After all, not all patients visit a psychiatrist with
thoughts of the legal repercussions of their visit.10 6 However, a person
who fears disclosure of her admission in therapy is not likely to allow
her relationship to transcend into any disclosures of an embarrassing
nature.10 7 This is likely to hinder the effective and safe use of psychoth-
erapy. Further, that confidentiality is required to ensure successful ther-
apy with a patient because it is necessary for the patient to be comfortable
about relaying her innermost thoughts. 0 8 Therefore, a threat to secrecy
is an effective barrier to the treatment of a psychiatric patient which
harms the patient as well as society. 0 9 This is best articulated in the
often quoted statement:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else
in the world. [She] exposes to the therapist not only what [her]
words directly express; [she] lays bare [her] sins, and [her]
shame ... it would be too much to expect them to do so if they
knew that all they say - and all that the psychiatrist learns
from what they say - may be revealed to the whole world from
the witness stand."0
For these reasons, the psychiatrist has a compelling need to maintain
confidentiality within a psychotherapeutic setting."' This privilege also
promotes the well-being of society, as it encourages the citizen to exercise
her fundamental freedoms by seeking the help of a psychiatrist." 2 Con-
1"3 See supra note 101; People v, Pack, 248 Cal. Rptr. 240, 102 Cal. App. 3d
679 (1988). See also Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 26 Mass. App. 699, 532 N.E.2d
691 (1988).
'" Confidentiality is necessary for psychiatric treatment to progress success-
fully. Group for Advancement of Psychiatry, Confidentiality and Privileged Com-
munication in the Practice of Psychiatry, REP. No. 451 at 92 (1960).
" 'Almeda County v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 35, 194 Cal. App. 3d 121
(1987); Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 26 Miss. App. 699, 532 N.E.2d 691 (1988).
... See supra note 93.
... See supra note 104.
10' See Proposed FED. R. EVID. 504 advisory committee's note; In re Marazit,
233 N.J. Super. 488, 559 A.2d 447 (1989).
See In re Maraziti, 233 N.J. Super 488, 559 A.2d 447 (1989).
"'Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955); M. GUrTMACHER
& H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
. Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 438 N.E.2d 1064 (1982).
"' In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983).
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sequently, citizens who address and resolve mental health problems will
be able to cope and be productive members of society. Recognizing this
fact, state legislatures in forty-nine states have enacted a psychiatrist-




The concerns surrounding a lack of confidentiality in a psychologist-
patient relationship are similar to those considered in the psychiatrist-
patient relationship. For instance, in therapy, the relationship hinges
solely upon the patient's ability to trust and communicate openly, without
fearing the reaction of others concerning their innermost thoughts.14
Without this confidentiality, the individual will be unable to receive ad-
equate treatment. Often, a rape victim is traumatized to such an extent
that she is unable to cope in society without the assistance of a therapeutic
setting. In the absence of an atmosphere where she is able to freely
disclose her feelings, feelings which may be embarrassing by nature, the
victim becomes a dysfunctional member of society. This rationale was
followed in Commonwealth v. Kyle, when a Pennsylvania court deter-
mined that the need for confidentiality in a psychologist-patient rela-
tionship was so great that the defendant was not entitled to the rape
victim's records. 11 In this case, a Pennsylvania statute provided a psy-
chologist-client privilege which created an absolute bar to the disclosure
of the psychologist's file concerning the rape victim. 116 Further, the court
did not permit an in-camera review of the file to determine whether or
not the file was useful to the defendant's case.'
17
In this instance, the court found that a medical license is not the dis-
positive factor. Instead, the court's analysis relied on the legislature's
belief that highly confidential communications which take place between
a psychologist and a client should be afforded a privilege.1 8 The fact that
therapy in this case involved a sexual assault further magnified the need
for privacy since a rape is a particularly private invasion of the victim's
rights.119
"13 See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 489, 533 A.2d 120, 127
(1987) (quoting Knapp, Vandecreek & Zirkel, Privileged Communications for Psy-
chotherapists in Pennsylvania, A Time for Statutory Reform, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 267,
275 (1987)).
114 Supra note 113. (The court granted a psychologist-patient privilege viewing
this privilege as analogous to the physician-patient privilege).
-, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 488, 533 A.2d 120, 126 (1987).
I's 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (1979) as amended 1989; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. See also People v. Colorado, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986) (state statute granting
psychologist-patient privilege).





In addition, the court in Kyle reiterated the Supreme Court's position
that the United States Constitution affords an individual the right of
privacy under certain circumstances.120 Arguably, the right of privacy of
the psychotherapy of a rape victim is also a constitutional right. Failure
to recognize this constitutional right infringes upon a citizen's funda-
mental rights.121 To adequately enforce this right, the confidentiality priv-
ilege should be absolute unless the victim chooses to waive this right.122
The Kyle court further noted that the psychologist-client privilege is
analogous to the psychiatrist-patient privilege. 12 3 Regardless of whether
a psychiatrist or psychologist is performing psychotherapy, the patient's
confidence in her confidentiality is imperative since "[tihese inner-most
thoughts are often so embarrassing or shameful that the patient may
never before have allowed themselves to acknowledge them."124 For these
reasons, the legislature in Pennsylvania has promulgated a psychologist-
patient privilege. 1 5 Other states should follow the Pennsylvania lead.
b. Social Worker-Client Privilege
A similar type of confidential and personal interaction takes place be-
tween a social worker and a client. Similar to a psychologist, the social
worker, who also does not have a medical license, is often a party to
confidential communication with clients. The social worker-client rela-
tionship has been granted a privilege because it has been determined
that the social utility of this particular relationship is so great that it
outweighs society's interest in having all possible evidence disclosed in
the litigation. 26 Further, the vitality of this relationship depends upon
strict confidentiality between the parties involved.127 Therefore, a confi-
dentiality privilege should exist to protect the rights of the victim seeking
the aid of a social worker. 28
120 Id. at 127 citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy encompasses a
woman's right to choose abortion); Stanton v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (privacy
entails the right to be free of intrusions and control of one's thoughts); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy includes the right to choose contra-
ceptives). See supra note 98.
121 The Kyle court discusses the constitutional dimension of affording the victim
privacy in a psychotherapeutic setting. Kyle, 369 Pa. Super. at 484, 533 A.2d at
120.
1"2 Statutes exist in Pennsylvania granting an absolute privilege to protect the
patient's/client's constitutional right to privacy. Kyle, 369 Pa. Super. at 484, 533
A.2d at 120.
12 See Kyle 367 Pa. Super. at 494, 533 A.2d at 126 (1987) (citing Advisory
Committee Note to Proposed FED. R. EvD. 504).
:- Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989).
2 Id.
128 Comment, The Social Worker-Client Relationship and Privileged Commu-
nications, 1 WASH. U.L.Q. 362, 365 (1965).
"I Id. See also 8 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE 229, 549-53 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)
(The rationale behind the proposed federal rules of evidence is that the confidential
nature of certain relationships, including the social-worker client relationship,
mandates a privilege to ensure the patient that their disclosures will not be
divulged in court).
128 Id. (Certain relationship are dependent upon the assurance of confidential-
ity.)
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Whether a victim in a rape case visits a licensed psychotherapist or a
non-licensed social worker is often an economic determination. 129 It seems
unjust to exclude the impoverished from the privilege of confidential
disclosures merely because they are unable to afford a licensed practi-
tioner. However, critics of this privilege have argued that the ascertain-
ment of truth is more important than whether a person may not enter
therapy or may be frightened into non-disclosures during the course of
therapy due to lack of confidentiality.130 Opponents also argue that social
workers are not adequately trained to do the kind of probing in counseling
that a privilege is designed to protect. 13' This is simply not the case. A
social worker is trained to develop a confidential relationship with her
client, especially in the case of rape. 13 2 In fact, in anticipation of her
exposure to confidential disclosures, a social worker must take an oath
of privacy. 33 Taking these factors into consideration, some courts have
afforded a privilege to the victim after balancing the defendant's need to
have all possible evidence disclosed in litigation against the victim's need
for privacy.13 4 In fact, in the absence of a statute affording this privilege,
some courts have extended the confidentiality privileges offered to the
psychiatrist-patient and psychologist-client relationship to the social
worker-client relationship after considering the analogous relationship
involved.13 5 This current trend is promising to advocates of the rape-crisis
center counselor-victim relationship because it demonstrates that the
focus towards viewing the privilege is on the relationship involved and
not the presence or absence of a medical license.
c. Rape Crisis Center- Victim Privilege
The relationship between a rape-crisis center counselor and a victim
is analogous to the psychiatrist-patient, psychologist-client, and social
worker-client relationship. In fact, the rape crisis center is often the venue
where many rape victims first discuss their feelings.'36 Furthermore, the
rape crisis center has a similar need to ensure the victim of confidential
disclosures. 137 In the absence of this, many victims are reluctant to seek
therapy and further prosecute their attacker.' s
129 See supra note 126.
130 See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357, 1366 (1989).
"I See also In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 20, 428 A.2d 126
(1981) (where a rape crisis counseling center states that "volunteers [at the center]
are extensively trained in [the specific area of] rape crisis counseling."
132 See infra note 251.
13a Id.
"1 See supra note 126.
135 Id.
136 Burgess & Holstrom, Crisis and Counseling Requests of Rape Victims, 23
J. oF NURSING REs. 196-202 (1974); J Van Atta, A Guide for Developing Com-
prehensive Rape Counseling Services in Ohio (September, 1987) (A publication of
Ohio Department of Health Rape Prevention Program).
137 See supra notes 97-135. See also supra note 63.
138 See supra notes 42 and 75.
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A rape victim has several additional reasons which substantiate her
need for confidentiality. In contrast to some people who seek psycho-
therapy, the rape victim has knowledge that they will eventually be in
a courtroom setting. 19 Therefore, in the absence of a privilege, the threat
of disclosure is imminent. As in the social worker-client relationship,
many of these women are unable to afford therapy with a licensed psy-
chiatrist. 140 Insufficient economic means is no reason to limit a woman's
right to privacy.
Undeniably, there is a necessity for the courts to develop rules of priv-
ilege by balancing the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront
his accuser14 ' with the victim's right to privacy.' 42 However, since the
issue in a rape case is not the victim's mental health, but rather the
events of the incident in question, an absolute privilege will not deter
the truth-finding process.143 As a result, if the state legislatures grant a
privilege, as they have in the psychiatrist-patient'" and the psychologist-
client 145 context, the defendant will be entitled to the same leverage in
his case as he is under those circumstances. After all, the trial itself and
the relationships involved are analogous to the other aforementioned
contexts in which the victim is granted a privilege.
The defendant will still be provided the opportunity to cross-examine
the victim.' 4 Further, the defendant may also question the counselor as
to the incident in the absence of a perusal of the victim's rape crisis center
records. 147 Therefore, an extension of the privilege to the rape-crisis center
context will be fair and just to all of the parties involved in the case.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADMITTING MENTAL HEALTH
RECORDS INTO EVIDENCE
A. The Child Victim
The United States Constitution affords the defendant the right to con-
front his accuser and to compel evidence in the courtroom setting.1"
"'9See To COMFORT, supra note 63, at 17-22 (1983) and accompanying text
(making the argument that a lawsuit is not the forefront of a patient's mind).
See also supra note 94 and accompanying text (making the distinction in the
often underreported context of rape where a victim has knowledge that they will
ultimately face their attacker in court). See also R. GROSSMAN, SURVIVING SEXUAL
ASSAULT 17-22 (1983).
140 See supra note 129 (referring to the economic disability of several of the
social worker's clients).
141 See supra note 43.
14' See supra notes 45 and 120 and accompanying text.
'4 See supra note 69. See also Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
I" See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
"'5See supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 53. See also infra note 216.
141 Id. See also supra note 69.
"18 See supra note 43.
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Arguably, the gathering of all information imperative to the defense of
the accused should be available.149 In addition, the victim has the right
to privacy in matters concerning her personal health and welfare. 150 In
order to maintain these constitutionally guaranteed rights, the court
must carefully balance these considerations.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's
constitutional rights were not violated when he was denied access to the
Children Youth Services file of a victim of rape and sexual incest.'5 '
However, the Court did allow the trial court to view these records in order
to determine their relevance to the case. 152 This occurred because the
Pennsylvania statute did not grant an absolute privilege; rather, the
statute provided that the records shall be disclosed under certain circum-
stances pursuant to a court order. 1 The Supreme Court has yet to rule
on the constitutionality of a statute providing an absolute privilege.
54
In order to mandate the overturning of his conviction, on remand, the
defendant in Ritchie must show that the information that he was denied
would have been favorable to him and would have an effect on the de-
termination of his guilt or innocence. 1u5 The Court did not deny that the
government had the obligation to order access to discoverable evidence
which would materially effect the defendant's case. 15 6 Rather, the court
noted that the statutory privilege existed and should be honored.
157
Justice Powell noted that the defendant's right to confrontation is not
absolute:
Normally, the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if
defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question wit-
nesses. The confrontation clause only guarantees the oppor-
tunity for effective cross examination and not cross examina-
tion that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,
defense may wish.158
Powell stated that the availability of these records may seriously under-
mine the state's efforts to treat child abuse."59 Although the Court noted
14D Id.
15 See supra notes 44 and 120.
15,480 U.S. 39 (1987)
152 Id.
15 Id. at 58.
154 Id. at 57 ("We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would
have been different if the statute has protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law enforcement and judicial personnel.").
161 Id. at 57 citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
156 Id. at 56 citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) ("evidence
is material only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.")
1-1 Id. at 53 ("Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would override the Com-
monwealth's compelling interest in confidentiality on the mere speculation that
the right has been useful to the defense.").
"Is Id. at 53 citing 22 FED. R. EVID. Serv. 1.
1" Id. at 58.
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that the state of Pennsylvania has granted an unqualified statutory priv-
ilege for communications between sexual counselors and victims, it does
not render opinion on the specific issue.'6° However, the Court recognized
that the defendant does not have the right to make an unsupervised
viewing of the evidence, thereby favoring an in-camera inspection of child
abuse records.
16 '
However, when there is child-abuse rape, the state courts do not always
limit the privilege of the victim by allowing an in-camera inspection of
the records. 16 2 The age of the victim is a central concern to the court in
determining the admissibility of psychological records, but the nature of
the crime is often the dispositive factor. 163 This is why a closer exami-
nation of these cases is necessary to render an opinion regarding the rape-
crisis center records of the adult victim.
Because child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and
prosecute, there is extra care in enforcing the confidentiality privilege of
children. 1 4 The same is true of rape in general. 65 However, in the instance
of child abuse, the court is able to use a child abuse statute to justify
keeping the records of a child out of the courtroom.'F6
Special considerations affect the result of the balancing test enacted
by the courts when the victim's privilege is found to outweigh the de-
fendant's right to confrontation. 167 For instance, if the abuse is from a
parent or guardian, the victim's feelings of guilt and vulnerability are
escalated.168 Due to this fact, it is essential to have a counseling atmos-
phere which provides the victim with the assurance of confidentiality.
69
The compelling interest of the commonwealth would be frustrated if they
are unable to assure the victim and any suspecting adult that information
will be disclosed solely to the counselor and to no other without an even-
tual disclosure in court. 70 Conversely, the defendant may argue that the
difficulty in disproving this stigmatizing allegation may render the rec-
ords all the more necessary to his or her defense. 17' However, the Supreme
Court has held that the presence of a statute affording the child a privilege
must be honored to uphold this right.172 Therefore, a special guarantee,
albeit a limited one, surrounds the children services programs which
cannot be outweighed by the defendant's need for the psychological rec-
ords.
17
10Id. at 57 citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 35945.1(b) (1982).
Id. at 56.
State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 530 A.2d 806 (1987).
See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); State v. Thiel, 236 Mont.
63, 768 P.2d 343 (1989); State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 530 A.2d 806 (1987).
' See State v. Thiel, 236 Mont. at 67, 768 P.2d at 345.
1 See supra notes 42 and 75 and accompanying text.
1 See Thiel, 236 Mont. at 67, 768 P.2d at 345; Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39 (1987).
117 Thiel, 236 Mont. at 67, 768 P.2d at 345.
118 Id. See also E BASS, COURAGE TO HEAL 1-35 (1988).
1'69 Thiel, 236 Mont. at 68, 768 P.2d at 346.
17 Id. at 67, 768 P.2d at 345.
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Evidentiary conclusions analogous to those surrounding the adult vic-
tim have been drawn, and the courts have denied the defendant access
to the children's psychological records. For instance, in People v. Tissois,
the Court held that once a material is deemed confidential, it may not
be used to impeach a witness.174 In addition, the records, even if they are
not found to be confidential, may not be a valuable source of impeach-
ment. 175 It is for these reasons that confidentiality clauses have been added
to statutes which exist in cases involving children. 176 These confidentiality
clauses should be extended to adult rape cases as well. After all, statutes
which protect the confidentiality of children have generally been held to
be constitutional.
177
B. The Adult Victim
1. State Legislative Action
The Supreme Court has yet to decide the constitutionality of a rape-
crisis center counselor-victim privilege.178 However, several states have
instituted statutes which afford the victim of rape privacy when she has
confided in a sexual assault counselor. 179 Yet, in some states these statutes
are designed to protect the victim but do not necessarily specify that the
mental health records of the victim should be excluded from evidence. 80
174 516 N.Y.S.2d 314, 131 A.D.2d 612 (1987).
175People v. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d 337, 521 N.E.2d 86 (1988).
176 State v. Thiel, 236 Mont. 63, 768 P.2d 343 (1989); People v. Foggy, 121 111.
2d 337, 521 N.E.2d 86 (1988); Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
177 See infra notes 178-99 and accompanying text.
178 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39. In Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 1990 WL 200131
(Pa. Super. 1990), the court noted that the Supreme Court will be reviewing two
cases which will consider the constitutionality of a rape-crisis center-victim priv-
ilege. Id.at 8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aultman, 387 Pa. Super. 113, 563 A.2d
1210 (1989); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa. Super. 580, 544 A.2d 1381 (1988).
In Wilson, the court viewed 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945.1 (1990) which grants an
absolute privilege to rape-crisis center personnel as applying only to protect a
sexual assault counselor from being examined as a witness in court. Therefore,
the case was remanded to grant an in-camera viewing of the records. In Aultman,
the privilege was also held to apply only to the testimony of rape-crisis center
personnel. Both of these cases undermine the purpose of the privilege which is
to protect the victim and not the rape crisis center personnel. The statute, 42 Pa.
Conn. Stat. § 5945.1 (1990) was drafted in response to a case which held against
granting the rape victim a privilege centering confidential disclosures to a rape
counselor. See In re PARR, 494 Pa. 15, 60, 428 A.2d 126, 149 (1981). In Hyatt,
Justice Elliot disagrees with this interpretation stating "it makes little sense
that a statute designed to grant a privilege of confidentiality for any communi-
cation between a rape victim and a counselor would not further protect the records
or reports made by the counselor in the course of his or her counseling efforts."
Id. at 6. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will clear up this discrepancy and view
the statute as the legislature intended it to be viewed; as one which grants the
victim of rape and absolute privilege protecting her disclosures in court.
179 See infra notes 190-200 and 297-322 and accompanying text.
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Rather, they protect the past sexual history of the victim from court
examination.' 8' The legislature has yet to decide whether or not the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the victim can be inter-
preted as a mechanism for allowing the defendant to enter the victim's
psychological records into evidence. State courts remain split on this
issue.
Federal courts have noted that in the absence of a Federal Rule of
Evidence specifically granting a privilege and federal case law addressing
this issue, an alternative source of protection may be the patient's con-
stitutional right to privacy in receiving medical treatment. 18 2 This right
would still be subject to the licensed practitioner versus the non-licensed
practitioner distinction. 8 3 This clearly will not afford every victim of rape
who has received a counseling privilege.
Therefore, a determination of state law on the issue is necessary to this
analysis. The Confrontation Clause, which the defendant uses to assert
his rights to have access to the victim's records, is made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.'S4
This is due to the fact that a defendant in a criminal case has certain
due process rights.185 Among these rights is the "fundamental" right of
confronting his accuser in court. 186 Therefore, if this "fundamental" right
of the defendant is violated, his due process rights are thereby violated.1
8 7
As a result, the defendant has the right to confront the victim and to
cross-examine all of the witnesses in his case. 188 However, this right does
not provide the defendant with an unrestricted opportunity to cross-
1"' For instance in Ohio, the Rape Shield Statute merely protects the victim
from an examination of her past sexual history. The Ohio Rape Shield Statute
states in pertinent part:
Evidence specific instances of the victim's sexual activity, opinion evidence
of the victim's sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual
activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it involves evidence
of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the victim's past sexual
activity with the offender, and only to the extent that the court finds that
the evidence is material to the fact at issue in the case and that its inflam-
matory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.
OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Baldwin 1989).
81 id.
182 Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Anyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1030 (D. Hawaii,
1979); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 954 (1976).
' See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
1 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965). See also U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV.
"'See supra note 2.
"' See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to... be confronted with witnesses against him to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.").
182 Due process enables a citizen to assert his rights granted by the U.S Con-
stitution.
I See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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examine the witness or an unlimited right to discovery.9 9 After all, the
victim, especially in a sexual crime, is at least alleging that she has been
violated. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the victim's rights as well
when determining whether or not the defendant has had his constitu-
tional rights violated.
Legislative intervention is necessary to provide guidelines for courts
to follow when considering this issue. On one hand, the defendant is in
fact presumed innocent and must be treated as such. Conversely, the
victim's right to privacy under such a sensitive set of circumstances also
should be honored. The state of Illinois has addressed the issue and has
determined that the defendant's rights to confront his accuser are out-
weighed by the rape victim's rights to privacy. 9 In People v. Foggy, the
court noted the importance of maintaining a confidential relationship
between the victim and the personnel at the rape-crisis center.' 91 There-
fore, the court found an Illinois statute which was drafted specifically to
ensure a privilege to the victim for communications made to a rape crisis
center counselor to be constitutional. 192 The court further noted that the
purpose of this statute was to protect the victim of rape from the public
disclosure of statements made to counselors of organizations which were
designed to help the victim. 193 The dilemma of the absence of such a
privilege is illustrated by the state legislature:
Because of the fear and stigma that often results from those
crimes, many victims hesitate to seek help where it is available
at no cost to them. As a result, they not only fail to receive
needed medical care and emergency counseling, but [the vic-
tim] may lack the psychological support necessary to report
the crime and aid police in preventing future crimes.
1 9 4
ill See supra notes 102, 158 and accompanying text. See also People v. Bean,
137 Ill. 2d 65, 560 N.E.2d 258 (1990) (the court held that the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights were not violated when he was denied access to the privileged
mental health records of the victim in a murder case.). In Bean, the court further
noted the public policy favoring the non-disclosure of rape-crisis center records
in Illinois due to an unqualified statutory privilege. Id. at 92, 560 N.E.3d at 270.
9o The State of Illinois has drafted a statute providing victims of rape with a
confidentiality privilege for the disclosures they make in confidence to counselors
"of organizations established to help them." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802.1
(1985).
191 "The victim in this case was told that the services of the Quad City coun-
seling program were both free and confidential, but under the dissent's view the
advice would no longer be appropriate. A special admonition would become nec-
essary, to accommodate the very real possibility that a judge later would be
examining the records of the counseling sessions. This, we believe would seriously
undermine the valuable, beneficial services of these programs that are within
the protection of the state." People v. Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d 599, 500 N.E.2d
1026 (1988).
192 Id. See also People v. District Court of Denver, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986)
(sexual assault victim was protected by a privilege established in a state statute
for a psychologist-patient relationship).
193 Foggy, 149 App. 3d at 600, 500 N.E.2d at 1028.
114 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-8021(a) (1985) (found in the stated purpose




The Illinois statute which affords the victim of sexual assault a privilege
regarding her disclosures in counseling is effective since the privilege is
absolute. It is important to note that the legislature originally drafted a
statute which allowed for an in-camera inspection of the records. However,
the legislature later eliminated that provision, replacing it with a broader
statement of confidentiality. 95 The Foggy court noted that this statute
does not hinder the defendant's rights since the primary purpose of coun-
seling is to help the victim "understand and resolve her feelings about
the event" and "not to investigate the occurrence."'196 Consequently, the
"inspection of counseling records would not likely result in any material
useful to the accused.'
1 97
Therefore, without damaging the defendant's case, the statutory pro-
vision avoids putting the rape victim through an ordeal equaling the
horror of the original assault in order to bring her attacker to justice.198
Some state legislatures have followed this rationale and have drafted
similar statutes to the Illinois statute, thereby affording the victim a
confidentially privilege extending disclosures made to sexual counse-
lors.' "
2. Judicial Standards
The acknowledgement of the need for statutory reform is only begin-
ning. Many criminal defense advocates find an absolute privilege unjust,
and some state courts have found that the constitutional rights of the
victim are not violated by the admission of the rape crisis center records
into the courtroom or by in-camera review of these records by the judge.
2
00
This line of thought exists even though the mental health practice often
depends on "emotional" disclosures which may not have reliable eviden-
191 Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 601-03, 500 N.E.2d at 1028-29 (The appellant
court noted this occurrence.).
1Id. at 600, 521 N.E.2d at 1028.
197 Id.
1"' See Berger, Man's Trial, Women's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REv 1 (1977).
I Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (Pennsylvania has a statute
granting a victim absolute confidentiality in her communications with a sexual
assault counselor); People v. District Court of Denver, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986)
(statute affording psychologist-patient privilege denied to the defendant of access
to sexual assault records). See Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives,
469 A.2d 1161 (R.I. 1983) (The State of Rhode Island proposed a confidentiality
privilege, but the privilege was a qualified one which enabled in-camera inspec-
tions).
" Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1356 (1989) (The court
allowed the victim's records to be viewed after the victim was sexually assaulted
in a day care facility); Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A.2d
220, overruled by 509 Pa. 374, 502 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1956). (This case took into
consideration the specialized needs of children in therapeutic relationships); Ad-
visory Opinion to R.I., 469 A.2d 1161 (1983) (The court in this case proposed a
statute which afforded the victim a confidentiality right, but still allowed an in-
camera viewing of the victim's records.).
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tiary significance. 2 1 In contrast, other courts have honored a confiden-
tiality privilege for the victim, finding that the defendant's rights were
not violated by the non-disclosure of the victim's records.
202
In the absence of clear precedent, it has been necessary for trial courts
to determine the parameters of a defendant's constitutional right to con-
front when use of the victim's recourse is at issue. In State v. Apostle, the
trial court considered the following factors in trying to determine whether
or not to disclose the victim's records: the nature of the confrontation
which is allegedly affected; the nature of the material examined; the
remoteness of the material; and the availability of other means of testing
the witness' reliability. 20 3 In considering these factors, the courts will
perform a balancing test.20 4 This test determines whether or not the de-
fendant's need to obtain confidential matter in order to discover impeach-
ing material necessary to exercise his right to confront the victim
outweighs the victim's right to confidential communications in therapy.20 5
Of course, it may also follow that the material is not pertinent to perform
effective cross-examination.
20 6
Another test performed by courts is the "compelling public interest"
test.20 7 In this test, an interest is "compelling" if the court determines
that it is strong enough to merit the non-disclosure of the victim's psy-
chological records.208 In addition, a "compelling" interest is one in which
it is imperative to the nature of the relationship to maintain the sanctity
of confidential disclosures.2 0 9 This is applicable to the rape crisis center
counselor-victim relationship because this relationship is generally one
which has an aura of confidentiality.210 In fact, the Connecticut court
stated the following concerning the nature of the counselor-victim rela-
tionship:
Information given by a psychological patient or a victim of
sexual assault is generally given with the belief that they may
obtain care (or counseling) without fear of unwanted embar-
201 Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,
25-30 (1980). In a therapeutic setting, there is generally a confidentiality re-
quirement which is strictly adhered to by the judicial system and the legislatures.
There is also a problem with the testimony of a medical patient being hearsay.
202 People v. Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d 599, 521 N.E.2d 1026 (1988) (Of course,
there was a state statute affording a privilege in this instance).
20 8 Conn. App. 216, 512 A.2d 947 (1986).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d
at 599, 521 N.E.2d at 1026.
107 See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 489, 533 A.2d 120, 125
(1987).
205 Id.
209 Commonwealth v. Sims, 513 Pa. 336, 521 A.2d 391, 395 (1987) quoting
Proposed FED. R. EVlD. 504 advisory committee's note (would have established a
psychologist-patient privilege).
311 State v. Bruno, 1 Conn. App. 384, 394, 473 A.2d 311 (1980), af/d, 197 Conn.
326, 499 A.2d 756 (1985).
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rassment and without apprehension of fundamental disclosures
in court, either of which might deter the patient (or victim)
from revealing his true symptoms.
211
The Court in Commonwealth v. Lloyd noted that a defendant's interest
may also be "compelling" if he is unable to defend himself in the absence
of his access to records. 212 This supposition has been denied by the
Supreme Court in a case involving the sexual abuse of a child.2 13 The
Lloyd Court also noted that the defendant must show a "particularized
need" for the records which is sufficient to outweigh the victim's need for
privacy.214 However, "particularized need" is not clearly defined; there-
fore, it is hard to rationalize the admission of records based upon this
test.
Another argument asserted on the defendant's behalf is that the rights
of the defendant to cross-examine and impeach the witness are violated
by barring such evidence from trial. 215 This simply is not the case. Courts
have rejected this argument because an attorney can still cross-examine
and impeach the witness absent this evidence.2 16 Since the defendant is
not excluded from a trial, he is not denied the right to physically confront
his accuser. 21 7 Further, the right to cross-examine a witness is a trial
right which does not require the pre-trial disclosure of information by
any party.215 The Confrontation Clause enables the defendant to have
access to effective cross-examination techniques, but it does not enable
the defendant to cross-examine in whatever way and to whatever extent
he may wish.
219
Lastly, the defendant may assert that an in-camera inspection of the
records should be granted as a last resort to allow the court to determine
their relevance. This has been held to be a viable alternative to admitting
records into court.220 In fact, it is an inadequate means of protecting the
victim's rights since the advocate may discover relevant information gath-
ered from the victim, other witnesses, or circumstances surrounding the
rape investigation.2 1 For instance, in Commonwealth v. Kyle, where a
211Id. at 316.
212 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989).
213 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
214 523 Pa. at 427, 567 A.2d at 1357.
215 Id. See also Delaware v. Fensterrer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam); Ad-
visory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (1983) (the court
held that the proposed statute would indicate the right of the accused to confront
the accuser to obtain compulsory process and to offer testimony).
216 Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987).
217 Id. at 489, 533 A.2d at 122.
218 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989).
219 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. But see Commonwealth v. Rit-
chie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (The Supreme Court suggested that making information
privileged may violate the compulsory process requirement of the Sixth Amend-
ment. Yet, even taking this into consideration, the privilege afforded these records
was still held to be constitutional.).
0 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58.
221 State v. Thiel, 236 Mont. 63, 768 P.2d 343 (1989); People v. Foggy, 121 Ill.
2d 337, 521 N.E.2d 86 (1988) (The Illinois statute was specifically amended to
exclude an in-camera viewing of the records by the court).
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victim was raped at knife point in a storeroom at her place of employment,
the court held that it was not a denial of the defendant's constitutional
rights to deny him access to the victim's psychological data and an in-
camera inspection of the records.222 In Kyle, the court disallowed an in-
camera inspection since it would enable the advocate to misuse sensitive
psychological data compiled regarding the victim.2 23
Therefore, the records of the victim should not be admitted into evidence
absent any evidence which clearly would mandate their necessity. An
absolute privilege granted by statute would guarantee the victim of a
sexual assault that her disclosures would remain privileged.2 24 Some
might object to this absolute privilege, but there is no pertinent principle
in the United States Constitution which is likely to strike down a statute
providing a rape crisis center counselor-victim privilege.
However, it has been argued that the compulsory process requirement
of the Sixth Amendment of a state constitution protects the accused by
assuring him of his due process rights.225 The court in Lloyd reasoned
that the Compulsory Process Clause of the state constitution guaranteed
the accused the right to have compulsory process to obtain "witnesses in
his favor and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 2 2 6 In his
dissent, Justice Larsen suggested that compulsory process rights, though
fundamental, are not absolute.227 For instance, state evidentiary rules
based on "legitimate state interests which exclude certain witnesses or




Therefore, just as the right to confront his accuser is not violated by
an absolute statutory privilege, the right of compulsory process is also
not violated by such a law. Further, implicit in the right to compulsory
process is the right to examine witnesses, and this is not nullified by the
presence of a privilege. The conclusion that a statutory privilege does not
violate the Compulsory Process Clause has been reached by courts who
have reviewed the issue.2 29 As a result, a statute granting an absolute
privilege is not likely to violate the Compulsory Process Clause.
Considering the danger of an in-camera inspection ° and the uncer-
tainty of the outcome of any of the aforementioned balancing tests,2 3 1 an
222 367 Pa. Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987).
223 Id.
224 Foggy, 149 111. App. 3d at 599, 521 N.E.2d at 1026.
m Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989). The court held
that the right to inspect the records was mandated by the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution which further mandated a disclosure of
the victim's records.
2 Id. at 432, 567 A.2d at 1359.
22 Id. at 437, 567 A.2d at 1362 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 457 Pa.
237, 240, 324 A.2d 350 (1974)).
Id. Arguably, the confidentiality of disclosures made in therapy is an ade-
quate state interest which should bar the admissibility of these records in court.
People v. Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d 599, 500 N.E.2d 1026 (1986); Common-
wealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987); Advisory Opinion of the
House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (R.I. 1983).
2' See supra note 222.
21 See supra notes 200-13.
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absolute privilege is more favorable than a mere qualified privilege. For
example, if the privilege is qualified, the victim is not guaranteed con-
fidentiality but is merely assured that she may have this privilege if the
court deems it is proper in her case.
232
VI. THE SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING A CONFIDENTIALITY
PRIVILEGE
A. Evidentiary Concerns
In the absence of a confidentiality privilege, it is difficult to ensure the
victim that her personal and often embarrassing disclosures will not be
subject to the discerning eyes of the defendant's attorney.233 However, as
previously noted, the defendant has the constitutional right to confront
his accuser in court.234 The state courts are careful to examine the victim's
records to determine relevancy, and the existence of different types of
privileges which the judiciary may enforce often do not adequately ensure
the victim of privacy. After all, once the courts view a victim's records,
her privacy is shattered. Therefore, the legislatures will have to examine
the propriety of an absolute privilege or a qualified privilege.
23 5
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that in order to admit matters
into evidence, they must be relevant to the issue in the case.236 Assuming
arguendo that the evidence is relevant, the probative value of this evi-
dence must substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. 237 Therefore, the
defendant's constitutional right to confront his accuser does not encom-
pass the use of evidence which is either irrelevant or highly prejudicial.
23 8
Even if the evidence contained in the victim's records is deemed as rel-
evant, due to the embarrassing and private nature of this evidence, it is
highly prejudicial. The costs and benefits of granting a privilege even in
the case of relevant evidence will be examined further in another portion
of this note.
2 See supra note 191.
id.
See supra notes 148-232 and accompanying text (the constitutionality issue
is examined in full in the previous section).
15 In Illinois, the legislature at first enacted a qualified privilege, subject to
an in-camera inspection. Later, the Legislature made this privilege absolute. See
People v. Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d 599, 521 N.E.2d 1026 (1988). See also Advisory
Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (R.I. 1983) (where the
legislature proposed that the privilege should be qualified to allow an in-camera
inspection).
"' FED. R. EvIw. 401 (relevant evidence is all evidence, making the existence
of a fact more or less probable); FED. R. EviD. 402 (all evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible).
17 See FED. R. EvD. 403.
21 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), reh'g denied, 366 U.S. 978
(1967); State v. Bowden, 113 R.I. 649, 324 A.2d 631 (1984).
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Generally, any such determination of probative value versus prejudicial
effect would be a matter for the trial court to decide after viewing the
evidence. This should not be necessary in the instance of rape crisis center
records because the issue is not the victim's mental health, but rather
the events of the incident in question.239 Using this rationale, state courts
have denied defendant's access to the victim's records in a rape case after
the legislature afforded her with a confidentiality privilege.2 4 Further,
defense counsel does not have the right to conduct his own search of the
victim's records in order to determine relevancy.
241
In order to obtain access to the records, the defendant must demonstrate
the record's relevance to his defense, the materiality of the records, the
absence of a less intrusive means of access, 242 and the need for the rec-
ords.2 43 As stated earlier, the records do not concern the central issue in
the case, which is whether the victim was forcibly subjected to sexual
intercourse.244 Therefore, it is necessary to subject the victim to scrutiny
regarding the guilt, shame, and frustration that she experienced after
the event.2 45 In addition, there are much less obtrusive means of accessing
the necessary information. For instance, the victim may be subject to
cross-examination regarding the events in question.2 46 In People v. Pena,
the court was unable to find any evidence which indicated the utility of
the victim's rape crisis counseling records to the defendant's defense, and
therefore, held these records as inadmissible. 247 Of course, in the absence
of a statute which would deem these records as privileged, courts will
have to make a case by case determination which will result in the victim
having her private disclosures scrutinized by the court, whether or not
they are relevant to her case.
2 48
The defendant may also try to obtain access to the records by arguing
that a patient-litigant exception is applicable since the victim decided to
prosecute. This exception waives the patient's confidentiality privilege if
she places her mental health at issue.2 49 Usually, this waiver occurs when
a tort victim, whose mental health is in question, waives her psychiatrist-
patient privilege which would have afforded her the right to partake in
39 See supra notes 69 and 143 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 200.
141 See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ('There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.").
22 New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
24 People v. Tissois, 131 A.D.2d 612, 613, 516 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1987) (quoting
from In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 275, 294 A.2d 330, 344 (1978), cert. denied sub
noa. New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
2"See supra notes 69, 143 and 238.
"5 See supra note 10.
'"See supra note 219.
17 127 Misc. 1087, 487 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1985).
28See People v. Foggy, 149 Ill. App. 3d 599, 521 N.E.2d 1026 (1986).




confidential disclosures with her psychiatrist. 250 It is highly unlikely that
any court will apply the patient-litigant exception to a rape case, as her
mental health is not a triable issue.
In fact, the very nature of rape indicates a need to warrant not only a
confidentiality privilege, but a more stringent privilege to ensure the
victim's well-being. The ethical codes of professional responsibility obli-
gate psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers to keep matters with
their patients/clients confidential. 251 The extension of this obligation to
a non-licensed practitioner, such as a social worker, who does not have a
medical degree, indicates that the special nature of her work has been
taken into consideration.2 52 Therefore, the rape crisis counselor-victim
relationship merits special attention and protection by our judicial system
as well. This confidential relationship should not be violated when there
is no clear indication that its disclosure would aid the truth finding
process.
25 3
Even if this evidence is found to be relevant, and further, is not found
to be prejudicial enough to outweigh any probative value it may have, it
may be hearsay.2 4 Arguably, this may be considered an excited utterance,
which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Yet, further examination of
the nature of this information indicates that these statements are well
thought out rationalizations which are made after the fact in therapy,
and thus, do not qualify as excited utterances. In addition, the records
often contain the counselor's notes which reflect what she heard the victim
say in therapy. 255 These notes are often taken after the fact, merely stating
the recollection of the counselor as to what transpired.2 56 Often, courts
admit this information as useful because it is the opinion of an expert,
and not a layman. 257 However, it is important to note that regardless of
-,These determinations were made by courts in the examination of the psy-
chotherapist-patient relationship which does not necessarily indicate a highly
personal or heinous ordeal such as rape. Smith, Medical Psychotherapy Privileges
and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and Removing With The Other,
75 Ky. L.J. 473, 484-502 (1986-1987).
251 SOCIAL WORKER CODE OF ETHICS (National Association of Social Workers)
(1979); See also People v. Tissois, 516 N.Y.S.2d 314, 131 A.D. 2d 612 (1987) citing
CCPR 4058(2).
152 See SocIAL WORKER CODE OF ETHICS (National Association of Social Workers
(1979).
See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 562 Pa. 427, 561 A.2d 1357 (1989) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
See FED. R. EvD. 801; In Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428
A.2d 128 (1981), the court noted that the accused is granted the right to ascertain
what the plaintiffhas originally said. However, even prior inconsistent statements
made in therapy are limited to "statements of the complainant" and not inter-
pretations or reflections of the counselor, nor any statements reflecting counseling
to be revealed. Id. at 132.
Pittsburgh Action, 428 A.2d at 132.
See Carlson, Policing the Biases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L.
REv. 577 (1986). See also supra note 204.
257 FED. R. EVID. 702-706.
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ones opinion concerning the relevancy of those records, the rule barring
the use of hearsay prohibits even those out of court statements which are
relevant. 
58
B. The Courts Application of Various Types of Privilege
1. Types of Privilege
With these evidentiary considerations in mind, legislatures promulgate
rules regarding privileges. There are three dimensions of privilege to
consider. An absolute privilege would bar disclosure of the victim's records
to the defendant in all circumstances. 25 9 A qualified privilege would utilize
a balancing test which would allow the defendant to have access to the
victim's records if he could prove that the records were necessary to
ascertain the truth to such an extent that this outweighed the victim's
privilege.2 60 Lastly, the courts could merely determine if the records are
relevant, and if this is the case, allow their disclosure. 261 The first test is
the only solution which would allow the victim to be confident that she
could receive therapy in an atmosphere of trust because the other two
standards, the qualified privilege or the mere relevancy requirement, are
easy to circumvent by a clever manipulation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.26 2 For instance, using a balancing test, the court may grant
access to these records. Therefore, the victim would not be guaranteed
privacy. Also, if defense counsel could assert the record's potential rele-
vancy, at the very least, the court would allow an in-camera inspection
of the records to determine this fact. This could undermine the ultimate
goal of privilege which is to assure confidentiality under certain circum-
stances regardless of relevancy considerations.
2. In-Camera Inspections of the Record
In an attempt to maintain a fair balance between the concerns of both
the victim and the defendant, legislatures have enacted qualified privi-
leges which often result in the allowance of an in-camera inspection of
the records. 263 In doing this, the court would be able to view the records
2' Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); State v. Santose R.I., 413 A.2d
58 (1980).
2-9 See Prop. FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's notes; In re Marazit, 233 N.J.
Super. 488, 559 A.2d 447 (1989).
1 State v. Apostle, 512 A.2d 947 (Conn. App. 1986).
211 State of Conn. v. Whitaker, 202 Conn. 259, 520 A.2d 1018 (1987).
262 See supra note 191.
263 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Clithon v. Alaska, 158 P.2d 1279
(1988); State v. Whitaker, 202 Conn. 259, 520 A.2d 1018 (1987); State of Conn.
v. D'Ambrosia, 212 Conn. 50, 561 A.2d 422 (1989); People v. District Court in
and for the city and county of Denver, 719 P.2d 722 (1986); People v. Tissois, 516
N.Y.S.2d 314, 131 A.D.2d 612 (1987); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 311 Pa. Super.
1, 456 A.2d 1383 (1983); State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640 (1987); Advisory
Opinions to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (1983).
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and could determine whether or not the information is exculpatory in
nature. 264 Thus, this opportunity, which is provided for the defendant to
prove relevancy, results in the scrutiny by the court of the victim's con-
fidential disclosures to her counselor. 26 5 After this violation, it is of little
comfort to the victim that in the absence of a determination that these




Of course, the defendant is presumed innocent and should therefore be
able to gather all the pertinent information necessary to his defense.
26 7
It is with these good intentions that legislatures have enacted a qualified
privilege, rather than an absolute privilege. 28 In fact, in In re Pittsburgh
Action Against Rape, the defendant was afforded an in-camera inspection
of the records after convincing the court that the disclosure of truth
promoted the administration of proper justice.269 Further, in State of Con-
necticut v. Whitaker, the court held that there was sufficient ground to
hold that the failure to produce information is so detrimental to the
witness that it could merit counsel to request that the victim's direct
testimony be stricken.270 These decisions are a result of the bedrock prin-
cipal that the truth finding function of our system of criminal justice
outweighs the necessity for privacy that an absolute privilege of confi-
dentiality would create.
2 71
Theoretically, these considerations would also apply to the rape crisis
counselor-victim privilege. However, the crime of rape does not bring the
issue of the victim's mental health to the court's determination.2 7 2 In fact,
the only issue is whether or not the victim was forced into having sexual
intercourse with the defendant.2 73 With this in mind, the Illinois legis-
lature has determined that the in-camera inspection of records is not
helpful in the truth finding process.2 7 4 This is due to the fact that the
victim's psychological records may be used as a source of impeachment
during cross-examination .275 Therefore, this would especially hurt the
2"Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1161.
See supra note 263.
Whitaker, 202 Conn. at 259, 520 A.2d at 1018.
267 See supra note 2.
See supra note 261. See also supra note 191 (stating the downside to a
qualified privilege).
19 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
270 202 Conn. 259, 520 A.2d 1018 (1987) (citing In re Robert H, 199 Conn. 693,
708, 509 A.2d 475, 483 (1986).
1 8 WIGMoRE EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
272 See supra notes 69, 143, 238, and 244.
273 Id.
74 See People v. Foggy, 121 Ill.2d 337, 521 N.E.2d 86 (1988).
275 In People v. Tissois, 516 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315, 131 A.D.2d 612, 613 (1987), the
court noted that "a request to examine the privileged records for the purpose of
impeaching a witness's general credibility constitutes an impermissible use of
confidential material, citing People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 423 N.Y.S.2d
893, 393 N.E.2d 924 (1979); Cf In re Grand Jury Proceedings Special Investi-
gation, 118 Misc.2d 683, 461 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1983).
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prosecution's case if the defense attorney is able to view these records.
276
This evidence is not critical to the defense as it merely clouds the issue,
often bringing misleading information to the courtroom. The victim's
feelings regarding the attack are not important to the defense of proving
what actually occurred between the victim and the accused. Rather, they
prove to confuse the jury regarding the incident in question.
In-camera inspection is not limited to relevant material. 277 This is be-
cause courts reason that the defendant should not have to speculate as
to what the records contain to determine whether he has been prejudiced
by not having access to these records. 278 However, absent impeachment
purposes, there is no clear need to admit these records into evidence. Also,
during the cross-examination of the witness, leading questions are per-
missible. 27 9 These questions could substantially damage the victim's case
by recklessly disclosing her statements made in therapy.2 0 For instance,
questions regarding the victim's guilt after the crime may unnecessarily
give the jury the impression that she consented. This would be highly
misleading and inappropriate. Therefore, it would be an anomaly to admit
this type of testimony. Of course, the in-camera inspection is intended to
eliminate this problem.28 ' But once the defense counsel views the records,
the balance is skewed in the defendant's favor because access to the entire
record provides the defense attorney with knowledge regarding the vic-
tim's mental state, whether or not it is relevant.
28 2
3. Voire-Dire Examinations
An in-camera inspection may lead the court to determine that the
records are necessary to the voire dire process. 28 3 Arguably, the records
are useful if the voire dire process raises questions concerning the victim's
relationship with her therapist. 28 This instance only arises in a limited
context where the victim may have mental problems outside of those
arising from the rape. Therefore, the court, in State v. Pierson, set a
limitation upon the use of records in a case where there has been sexual
assault.285 In this instance, the defendant may only ask a therapist ques-
tions in regard to the victim's narrative describing the assault when a
voire dire is conducted which shows that the victim endured a mental
,76 See supra note 223.
77 State of Conn. v. Whitaker, 202 Conn. 259, 520 A.2d 1018 (1987).
178 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); State v. Bruno, 197 Conn.
326, 497 A.2d 758 (1985); State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 479 A.2d 949 (1984);
State v. Gonzales, 186 Conn. 426, 44 A.2d 852 (1982).
17 FED. R. EviD. 611(C).
180 People v. Foggy, 121 I1l.2d 337, 521 N.E.2d 86 (1988).
181 State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640 (1987).
282 Foggy, 121 Ill.2d at 337, 521 N.E.2d at 86.
- Id.




abnormality which would affect the credibility of her accusations toward
the defendant. 286 Since prior mental history is inadmissible, the therapist
must consent to partake in a voire dire examination. If the therapist
chooses not to consent to such a voire dire examination, his or her tes-
timony must be stricken.
This creates problems in the prosecution's presentation of her case. A
conflict of interest becomes present which the victim and her counsel
must resolve. In order to prevent the misuse of the victim's psychological
records in the courtroom, the victim must decide whether or not to allow
the court to view the very records in question. Since the defendant is
present during voire dire, he will hear all of the information presented
by the therapist, whether or not this information is ultimately admissi-
ble.2 7 Yet, these inconsistencies may have little to do with the events of
the incident in question. They may be purely a result of the victim's
continuing process of recovery. This process often helps to alter the vic-
tim's perception of herself in relation to the rape in order to help her cope
with the ordeal. This creates an opportunity for the defendant to view
this information using the eyes of an advocate to search for inconsistencies
which may later come up in the victim's testimony.2 8 Therefore, although
the voire dire is conducted with the interest to protect the misuse of the
victim's records, it ultimately brings harm to the victim. The redeeming
factor involved by the use of the voire dire to determine the record's
relevance is that the court may exclude the public from the courtroom
during these proceedings. 289 Also, portions of the victim's psychiatric
record, or the entire record, may ultimately become sealed by the court
following these proceedings. 290 This, however, does not alleviate the det-
rimental effect of having the defense counsel gain access to the records.
4. Policy Considerations
In the absence of a statute granting an absolute privilege, the rape
victim's rights are often undermined by the judicial interpretation of the
situation.291 The Illinois state supreme court has upheld a statute grant-




7 Id. at -, 514 A.2d at 733.
- Id.
289 Commonwealth v. Grayson, 466 Pa. 427, 353 A.2d 428 (1976).
o Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
2 Id. at 2737.
22 In the absence of a statute, the victim's rights are less influential than the
defendant's rights to the court. See Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 509 A.2d 415 (1986);
State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 497 A.2d 758 (1985); State v. Esposito, 192 Conn.
166, 470 A.2d 949 (1984); People v. Foggy, 121 lll.2d 337, 521 N.E.2d 86 (1988);
People v. Tissois, 516 N.Y.S.2d 314, 131 A.D.2d 612 (1987); State v. Thiel, 236
Mont. 63, 768 P.2d 343 (1989).
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the United States Supreme Court held that it is necessary to honor a
statutorily established confidentiality privilege. 293 However, not all states
have a specific statute granting the rape-crisis center-victim privilege.
In states such as Ohio, other similar privileges exist. For instance, in
Ohio, the reports and records of the probation department are considered
confidential. 294 In addition, courts have interpreted the Ohio Rules of
Juvenile Procedure to constitute a confidentiality privilege.295 These rules
are a result of the very nature of a social worker's and probation officer's
duties. 296 A special consideration is made in the case of juveniles due to
the special nature of these proceeding. Therefore, it is the next logical
step to afford a confidentiality privilege to the rape counselor-victim re-
lationship due to its confidential nature.29 7 The only effective means of
assuring the victim of this privilege is the promulgation of statutory
reform.
5. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Several types of information are communicated in a therapeutic setting.
As is well established, information obtained by a therapist which is not
relevant is clearly inadmissible. 298 For instance, information regarding
the general mental health of a rape victim is inadmissible. 299 However,
there are some types of information obtained through therapy which are
controversial among legislatures and courts in determining whether or
not it is appropriate to grant a privilege to the rape victim. Such contro-
versies arise when a rape victim makes a statement in therapy that is
inconsistent with her in-court statement, when a victim raises doubts as
to her identification of the key witness, and in the rare instance when a
victim states to her counselor that she may perjure herself.
These types of statements cast a serious doubt as to the propriety of a
privilege. Yet, in analyzing these statements, this note has considered
the fact that rationalizations made in therapy are highly unreliable.
Unlike an excited utterance, these victims are in the situation where
they are trying to rationalize their traumatic experience by casting doubt
upon the situation.30 0 The nature of a privilege is to deem that such
23 See supra notes 178-202 and accompanying text.
480 U.S. 39 (1987).
295 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.14 (Baldwin 1989).
2 State v. Keaton, No. H-84-47 (Ohio Court of Appeals, Nov. 1, 1985); (The
court stated that it is obvious from OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.14 (Baldwin
1989) and the juvenile rules that there is a presumption of confidentiality in
relation to a juvenile court proceeding).
27 State v. Thiel, 236 Mont. at 66, 768 P.2d at 345 (state has a compelling
interest to protect the records of social workers in different crimes).
1'9 FED. R. EvID. 402.
See supra note 182. See also supra note 180 (Ohio statute mandates the
inadmissibility of evidence regarding the victim's sexual history).
11 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
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relevant information is less valuable than the guarantee of privacy to
the victim. Four fundamental conditions must be met in order to guar-
antee a privilege: the communications must originate under the as-
sumption that they will not be disclosed; this element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the rela-
tionship between the parties; the relationship must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be seriously fostered; and the damage
to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
30 1
In the instance of rape, a victim seeking counseling needs to be assured
of privacy in order to pursue help. This victim realizes that she will
ultimately appear in a court of law. Therefore, if the victim chooses to
prosecute, absent a privilege, the victim will choose not to disclose her
doubts for fear that these would hinder prosecution. Worse yet, the victim
may choose not to prosecute her attacker for fear that her disclosures
will discredit her in court. This is clearly an anomaly. The cost of this
information is high due to the unreliable nature of therapy. Often times,
patients address issues with their therapist as a means of guilt reduction,
and they do not intend their statements to be dispositive of factual
issues.
302
The nature of this relationship hiiges on confidentiality. Prior incon-
sistent statements that are the therapists recollection are inadmissible.
30 3
This is a result of the realization that the therapist's notes are hearsay.
3 0 4
It follows than that statements which suggest the victim's doubt as to
the accuracy of the events of the evening, although relevant, are highly
unreliable. Such statements would not be made by a victim if she viewed
them as exculpatory evidence.
Of course, the defendant has a right to an adequate defense. Yet, as
the Wigmore criteria indicate, there are situations where the mainte-
nance of confidentiality is tantamount to the existence of a confidential
relationship.30 5 The rape crisis counselor victim relationship falls under
this category. In this instance, the accused attacker is still afforded the
opportunity of cross-examination 30 6 while the victim is able to maintain
a healthy confidential relationship with her therapist. In an area where
underreporting of a crime is so prevalent, it would be a great benefit to
30, 8 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
302 See supra note 18.
In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
3 4 
Id.
305 Supra note 301. See also G. WEISSENBERGER OHmo EVIDENCE 106 which reads
as follows: "In understanding privilege law, it should be appreciated that a priv-
ilege is essentially a personal right to preserve the confidentiality of certain
private communications. Inadmissibility is an incidental and derivative ramifi-
cation of this right. Consequently, privilege laws are anchored in considerations
of policy that exist independently of the usual evidentiary concerns with accuracy
and reliability of evidence.... A privilege permits a person to resist any judicial
or governmental process aim at eliciting protected information."
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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society to afford a privilege. The privileges already afforded under Rape
Shield laws have been helpful but are merely the first step.30 7 Since the
absence of a privilege would destroy the therapeutic relationship, this
information will become obsolete because the victim will choose not to
disclose her fears. Although granting a privilege is a large step to take
in a criminal case,30 8 it is necessary as the benefits of a privilege clearly
outweigh the costs of not having such a privilege.3°9
VII. STATUTORY REFORM
The state of Illinois has drafted a statute affording a victim of sexual
assault an absolute confidentiality privilege when she receives counseling
from any organization established to help her.310 In addition, the Con-
necticut legislatures has written a statute affording the victim of sexual
assault, as well as a battered women with a confidentiality privilege.
311
This statute carefully defines "sexual assault counselors" to be any person
engaging her services in a rape crisis center who has undergone the
requisite training and whose primary purpose is to aid victims of sexual
assault.312 "Victim" is defined as any person who consults a battered
women's counselor or sexual assault counselor.313 This type of statute is
promulgated by the concerns raised when only a medical doctor is afforded
such a privilege, since the rape crisis center is more likely to engage in
counseling sessions with the victim than is a doctor.314 Furthermore, con-
fidentiality is afforded to the victim unless the victim has "waived" this
privilege. 31 This waiver provision has rendered the statute an ineffective
safety device for some victims.
307 See supra note 180.
308 See supra note 2; see also G. WEISSENBERGER OHIo EVIDENCE 107.
3- This type of cost benefit analysis may differ in situations of child custody
suits, third party defendant suits where therapeutic information is requested,
cases where there is an insurance release signed by the victim, and cases where
the victim has filed a civil suit against her attacker due to her mental damage
caused by the rape. However, these determinations are beyond the scope of this
particular article.
310 Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 407 Mass. 879, 556 N.E.2d 356
(1990) (This case granted confidentiality for a sexual assault case of a minor since
confidentiality was a major concern).
311 See supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
31 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-14k (1990). In Connecticut Privileged Communication
between battered women's or sexual assault counselor and victims.
313 The rape crisis center is often the first place the victim receives any type
of counseling in this matter. Telephone interview, volunteer Lorain Crises Center
(Feb. 2, 1990); See also supra note 136.
314 Id. It is important to note that the counselor must be certified by her rape
crisis center, but is not a medical professional.
315 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146k(6) (1990).
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Because the victim is prosecuting her attacker, the courts have placed
limitation on this privilege.3 16 Therefore, courts have held that an in-
camera inspection of her records is necessary because the absence of such
an inspection would be an impairment to the defendant's right of con-
frontation .1 7 Loopholes such as this should be carefully considered by
legislatures who propose confidentiality statutes because an effective stat-
ute affording the victim a confidentiality privilege is likely to be held
constitutional. 318
In addition, the in-camera inspection of the victim's records undermines
the rationale behind the privilege. The rationale is to ensure the victim
absolute privacy in her disclosures to a counselor whether or not she
prosecutes the alleged rapist. Further, if a statute which wholly protects
the victim from possible exposure of her personal thoughts is non-existent,
there is no way for the rape crisis counselor to ensure the victim that
they may privately discuss problems which have occurred due to the
rape. 319 This fact could result in instigating a chilling effect on rape
prosecutions.3 2 0 Of course, the absence of any statute renders an even
more stringent result.
32 1
For instance, in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Lloyd, the majority
held for the admission of the psychotherapeutic records of a six year old
victim of rape into evidence.3 22 In Lloyd, the court held that the patient-
psychotherapist relationship was not privileged due to the fact that the
Pennsylvania legislature did not specifically promulgate such a privi-
lege. 323 Ironically, the Pennsylvania legislature had already afforded the
sexual assault counselor-victim privilege prior to this case.3 24 However,
the court did not find this applicable to the child's situation since he did
3 6 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146k(6)(b) (1990).
317 State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 497 A.2d 758 (1988); Connecticut v. Whitaker,
202 Conn. 259, 520 A.2d 1018 (1987) (records were admitted into evidence because
of their potential relevance); In re Robert H, 199 Conn. 693, 509 A.2d 475 (1986).
318 See supra notes 178-199 and accompanying text. Such a loophole exists in
the Pennsylvania statute, wherein the court has taken the privilege and applied
it only in instances where the rape crisis center personnel is likely to testify in
court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 1990 WL 200131 (Pa. Super. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Aultman, 387 Pa. Super 113, 563 A.2d 1210 (1989); Common-
wealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa. Super. 580, 544 A.2d 1381 (1988); Commonwealth v.
Samuels, 354 Pa. Super. 128, 511 A.2d 211 (1986) (In Hyatt, Justice Elliot stated:
a statute defining an absolute privilege should not be ambiguous; therefore I call
upon the legislature to set about to clarify the statute and to reaffirm its recog-
nition of the needs and interests of the rape victim in our society.)."I In re Robert H., 199 Conn. at 708, 509 A.2d at 490.
320 See supra note 191.
321 See supra notes 42 and 92.
322 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 347 (1973).
223 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989).
"I Id. at 430, 567 A.2d at 1358.
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not visit a rape crisis center 25 In the absence of a statute, the trial court's
in-camera investigation determined that the defendant's accusations that
the victim was delusional and/or hallucinatory were unfounded. 326 How-
ever, the appellate court overruled the sealing of the records and held
that the defendant should have the right to view the records with cross-
examination tactics in mind.327 This approach arguably gives the accused
an opportunity to ascertain what the victim has alleged.
32
The court in Lloyd notes that the defendant, if given the right to ex-
amine the entire record, will have access to the comments made by the
victim. 32 9 The court compromised by only allowing an in-camera inspec-
tion of the records. 3 0 Justice Larsen in his dissent held that this com-
promise is of little benefit to the victim who has had her rights violated
by both the alleged rapist and the judicial system.33 '
Larsen poignantly explained the reality of admitting these records into
evidence. He stated:
In this tragic case, a six year old child was repeatedly raped,
sodomized and otherwise sexually assaulted, her physical and
personal integrity violated, her privacy invaded and shattered,
by thirty-four year old Stephen Lloyd, who was the child su-
pervisor at the "Playstreet" child care program and a "trusted
friend" of her family. The majority of the court now continue
the assault upon this young rape victim's personal integrity,
assists in further invasion of her privacy, and quite possibly
retards her treatment by permitting her attacker virtually un-
limited access to all medical records generated by the psy-
chotherapeutic treatment which she has received in an effort
to deal with and hopefully overcome the emotional and psy-
chological damage inflicted by Mr. Lloyd. Thus, the criminal
"justice" system became an active accomplice in the violation
of another rape victim.
332
125 See Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 380 U.S. 49 (1987) (noting the absolute priv-
ilege afforded to this relationship). See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 59451 (b) (1990)
(A sexual assault counselor is defined as "any person who is engaged in any office,
institution, or center defined as a rape crisis center under this section, who has
undergone 40 hours of training and is under the control of direct services super-
visor of a rape crisis center whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice,
counseling or assistance to victim's of sexual assault.").
... Lloyd, 523 Pa. at 2, 567 A.2d at 1358.
32 Id. at 430, 567 A.2d at 1358 (citing Commonwealth v. Grayson, 466 Pa. 427,
428, 353 A.2d 428, 429 (1976), where the court began to reason in the defendant's
favor. It is this rationale that led the court to the ultimate holding as stated in
the text).
328 In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 429 A.2d 126 (1981).
11 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357, 1359 (1989).
2O Id. at 433, 567 A.2d at 1360.
- Id. at 437, 567 A.2d at 136. Larsen stated: '"The confidentiality of the psy-
chotherapeutic relationship is breached the moment defense counsel opens the
file, regardless of whether this is made in chambers or on a public thoroughfare."
Id.2 2 Id. at 433, 567 A.2d at 1360.
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As a result, Larsen asked the legislature to respond by drafting a
statute which would protect the rape victim who consulted a psychiatrist
after receiving treatment, as well as one who consulted a "sexual assault
counselor.'3 3 3 Two months later, the legislature responded promptly to
this plea, amending the statute which provided a psychologist-patient
privilege to also afford a psychiatrist-patient privilege.334 This demon-
strates the fact that a statute is the only truly effective means in which
to guarantee the victim privileged communications in therapy. Pure se-
mantics should not affect the victim's fate, but as we have seen, it does.
Further, social policy reasons lead to allowing a privileged communication
when a person partakes in a certain relationship which has a beneficial
function towards society and depends upon mutual disclosure between
parties in the relationship.33 5 This can be done by recognizing an absolute
privilege of communication which occurs between a rape victim and what-
ever type of counselor she chooses to see, be it a psychiatrist, psychologist,
social worker, or a rape crisis center counselor.
336
333 Id. at 433, 567 A.2d at 1375-76. ("Once again, I find myself in the position
of having to plead with the legislature to do that which this court should have
done. Because this court has refused to even acknowledge that some information
and potential evidence may, in our society, be protected against disclosure by
necessary and well recognized testimonial privileges, this is how no legal pro-
tection for the confidential communications between a psychotherapy patient and
her or his psychotherapist, not even when the psychotherapist is a psychiatrist.")
See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 562 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989) (This case
was decided in October of 1989). See also 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 5944 (1990). The
word "psychiatrist" was inserted into the statute to also afford this privilege.
However, this statute as interpreted is limiting the privilege to instances where
the counselor testifies. In Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 1990 WL 200131 (Pa. Super.
1990), Justice Elliot discussed the irony of this interpretation and stated:
Rape victims were very often stigmatized in our society. In order to circum-
vent a false accusation of rape, the law of this Commonwealth at one time
referred to the rape complaint as the "prosecutrix" required corroborating
evidence, and special jury instructions concerning the victim's emotional
vulnerability. Moreover, the laws of this state had required prompt reporting
of a rape, reasonable resistance by the victim, and even though it was not
permissible to scrutinize a rape victim's prior sexual history, a learned
defense counsel was always permitted to raise a question of the victim's
reputation in the mind of the jury. Such laws were premised on the myth
surrounding rape that the victim got what she wanted. Accordingly, often
times the legal structure degraded the victim all over again, in the court-
room, in responding to the initial assault. After having evolved socially,
legislatively to the point of codifying an absolute privilege concerning con-
fidential communications between a rape victim and a sexual counselor, to
now take a step back in time is not only offensive, but should be repugnant
to an enlightened society." Id. at 7-8.
35 Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and The Law of Privileged Com-
munications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 610 (1964) (involving an attorney/client,
priest/penitent, and physician/patient relationship). See also McCormick, The
Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447 (1938).3 6 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 562 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Victims of rape are personally, as well as physically, assaulted. The
violation they experience is often extended into the courtroom setting
where they are further reminded of the tragic incident. Often, victims
seek therapy as a form of solace. When the therapeutic relationship is
not confidential, it is not effective because of the personal and embar-
rassing nature of the crime.
The admission of therapeutic records into the courtroom setting is such
an example of the violation of victims rights. Due to societal prejudice,
many women are not reporting rapes since they would rather abstain
from being further violated in the courtroom. Further, if women knew
that their confidential statements made in therapy would become part of
public record, even more women would refrain from prosecuting their
attacker. As a result, few victims will actually bring their attacker to
justice.
The defendants' claim that their constitutional right to confront and
their right to compulsory process found in Article VI, Section 10 of the
Constitution enables them access to such records. This simply is not true.
Courts have repeatedly held that statutes precluding the courts from such
access to clinical records are indeed constitutional.
In addition, the courts perform a balancing test when determining
whether the defendant's right to ascertain the truth outweighs the vic-
tim's privilege of confidentiality. Many legislatures have yet to deem a
specific privilege for rape crisis center personnel, but have extended the
doctor-patient privilege into the psychotherapeutic setting. One impor-
tant aspect of this privilege is that it enables the victim to seek effective
therapy without fearing that this therapy will have a chilling effect on
the prosecution of her attacker.
Often, the victim may feel remorse and guilt. Regardless of whether
records disclose this phenomena, her admission into evidence is still a
personal invasion of her deepest thoughts.
In an attempt to balance the concerns of both the victim and the de-
fendant, courts have admitted the records into evidence in-camera. This
gives the defendant undue leverage because he is able to view these
records using the eyes of an advocate to assess the weaknesses of the
victim.
Arguments by the victims that these records are not necessary to the
pursuance of truth have been persuasive to some state legislatures. The
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 504 considered extending a privilege to the psychotherapeutic
setting. In addition, state legislatures have acknowledged that action
needs to be taken to protect the confidentiality privilege of sexual assault
victims. The next step is to have several state legislatures follow this
trend in order to mandate a uniform privilege for the victims of rape by
statute. In ensuring the victim a right to confidentiality, these statutes
would benefit both the medical and legal profession.
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